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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In 2013,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
rejected a challenge to the Navy's Undersea Warfare Training Range
(Range) off the coast of Jacksonville, Florida, based on potential impacts
the Range could have to the endangered North Atlantic Right Whale and
other endangered species.2 The court held that the Navy and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) had met their obligations
under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA as
amended and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA as amended
thus far in the project.' The court also decided two cases under the
Clean Air Act (CAA as amended.! In one case, the court upheld a
revision to Alabama's State Implementation Plan allowing sources of air
pollution to deviate from the standard limit for opacity, which the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had approved in 2008 but then
disapproved in 2011; the court held the agency's 2011 disapproval of the
change was unauthorized and the 2008 approval was a permissible
construction of the relevant provisions of the Act.' In another case, the
court held that the government's expert testimony, purporting to show
that equipment and process upgrades undertaken by Alabama Power
Company to reduce downtime at three of its coal-fired power plants
resulted in a significant increase in emissions, should have been ruled
to be reliable and admissible over a challenge under Daubert v. Merrell
* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1993).
1. For an analysis of environmental law during the prior survey period, see Travis M.
Trimble, Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 64 MERCER L. REV. 909 (2013).
2. Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 733 F.3d 1106, 1125 (11th Cir. 2013).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2012).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2012).
5. Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1125.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-71 (2012).
7. See infra notes 11 and 90 and accompanying text.
8. Ala. Envtl. Council v. EPA, 711 F.3d 1277, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2013).
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Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' even though the plants were "cycling"
plants and did not operate continuously at full capacity. 0
I. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT/
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Department of the Navy,"
the Eleventh Circuit held that the Navy did not violate NEPA when it
authorized construction of a Range without also authorizing the
subsequent operation of the Range at the same time.'" The court also
held that the NMFS did not violate ESA by issuing a biological opinion
on the impact to listed species of the Range without including an
incidental take statement related to the Navy's operation of the Range,
even though the opinion concluded that operation would likely adversely
affect listed species, including the North Atlantic Right Whale."
In 1996, the Navy announced its intention to build such a range in the
Atlantic Ocean. The proposed range would consist of undersea, fiber-
optic telecommunications cables and up to 300 nodes over a 500-square-
mile area. The nodes transmit and receive acoustic signals from ships
and submarines operating in the range. The Navy originally considered
and evaluated several sites off the Atlantic coast in 2005, and three
years later, it issued a revised draft Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS), proposing to build the Range fifty nautical miles off Jacksonville,
Florida. The Navy chose this location because of extensive operations it
already had in the area that would provide support for the Range.'
Among the environmental concerns the Navy considered in its final
EIS, issued in 2009, was the impact the Range would have on the North
Atlantic Right Whale, of which only 300 to 400 remain, and whose only
known calving grounds is located within the Range. The EIS addressed
the project in two phases: the construction of the Range, which was to
begin in 2009 and last into 2014; and the operation of the Range, which
would commence sometime between 2018 and 2023. The EIS concluded
that the impact of construction on the whale would be minimal. The EIS
also concluded that operation of the Range would not increase ship
traffic in the area over pre-existing levels (because the Navy already
9. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10. United States v. Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2013).
11. 733 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 2013).
12. Id. at 1125.
13. Id. at 1118-19.
14. Id. at 1109-10.
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conducts anti-submarine warfare training in the area). The EIS itself
was not challenged in this case. 5
To fulfill its obligation under the ESA, the Navy also consulted with
the NMFS concerning potential threats to endangered species posed by
the Range, including the whale and sea turtle. In 2009, after consulta-
tion with the Navy, the NMFS issued a biological opinion concluding
that the construction of the Range would not adversely affect listed
species, and that operation of the Range would likely adversely affect
listed species, including the whale and the sea turtle, but would not
jeopardize their continued existence. However, the NMFS did not issue
an incidental take permit for the whale as part of its biological opinion
at that time because an incidental take authorization for the whale
would only be effective for five years, and one issued in 2009 would
expire before operations began. The opinion stated that the NMFS
would issue a new opinion including an incidental take statement for
Range operation at that time."
Based on its final NIS and the NMFS's biological opinion, on July 31,
2009, the Navy issued a Record of Decision (ROD) announcing that it
15. Id. at 1110-11.
16. Id. at 1113. The NMFS is responsible for administering the ESA as to endangered
or threatened marine species. Id. at 1111. The ESA prohibits the "taking" of any
endangered species, which includes harm to the animal itself, and also prohibits
destruction of critical habitat. Id. at 1111-12. The ESA directs federal agencies to ensure
that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of, or destroy the
critical habitat of, any listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(aX2). Part of this obligation
includes consultation with the agency administering the ESA to determine whether harm
to any listed species is likely. Id. Consultation is a two-phase process: the agency
proposing an action first prepares a biological assessment to determine whether an action
'may affect" a listed species. Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1112. If so, the acting
agency must enter formal consultation with the expert agency, which then issues a
biological opinion discussing in detail potential adverse effects the proposed action will
have on listed species, stating whether the proposed action "is likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
critical habitat," and if so, what steps the acting agency must take to mitigate those effects.
Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(gX4) (2014)). Further, if, in its biological opinion, the expert
agency determines that the proposed action will not jeopardize listed species but that the
action may result in some incidental taking of such species, the opinion must include a
statement detailing the extent of the incidental taking and reasonable measures the acting
agency must take to mitigate the incidental taking (known as an "incidental take
statement"). Id. After an incidental take statement is issued, any take caused by the
federal action in compliance with the statement is lawful. Id. Relevant to listed marine
species, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-62, 1371-
89, 1401-17, 1421-23h (2012), allows incidental taking of small numbers of listed species
during periods of not more than five consecutive years. Id. at 1112-13; see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(5). Thus, an incidental take statement for listed marine species is effective for
five years after it is issued. Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1112-1113.
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would construct the Range at the Jacksonville site. The ROD stated
that it applied to construction only, and that the Navy was deferring
authorization of operation of the Range until it could determine more
accurately when operation would begin, at which time it would seek an
incidental take statement applying to operation.17
Defenders of Wildlife and other conservation groups (the plaintiffs)
filed suit in 2010, claiming that the Navy's ROD authorizing construc-
tion of the Range and the NMFS's biological opinion did not comply with
the NEPA and the ESA and were thus arbitrary and capricious."8 The
gist of the plaintiffs' challenge arose from the bifurcated nature of the
project and approvals for it: the plaintiffs claimed among other things
that the Navy violated the NEPA by issuing a ROD for construction of
the Range without issuing a ROD for operation; that NMFS violated the
ESA by issuing a biological opinion that failed to address in sufficient
detail potential adverse impacts on listed species of operation of the
Range; and that the NMFS's biological opinion violated the ESA by
failing to include an incidental take statement related to operation. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted
summary judgment to the Navy and NMFS on these issues.19
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.20 As to the Navy's ROD authorizing
construction of the Range but not its operation, the court noted that
while NEPA does require that an agency address related actions in a
single EIS so as not to segment a project and thereby potentially
prejudice environmental impact decisions about future stages of the
project based on past expenditures, nothing in NEPA prohibits an
agency from authorizing a project in stages.2 1 The Navy had prepared
an EIS that considered both construction and operation of the Range,
which fulfilled its NEPA obligation, and the court held it was not
prevented by NEPA from issuing a ROD authorizing construction
17. Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1113-14.
18. Id. at 1114.
[An agency action may be found arbitrary and capricious: "where the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise."
Id. at 1115 (quoting Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1264
(11th Cir. 2009)).
19. Id. at 1115.
20. Id. at 1125.
21. Id. at 1117.
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without also authorizing operation at the same time.2 While a NEPA
regulation related to RODs does prohibit an agency from taking any
action before issuance of a ROD that would limit the choice of reasonable
alternatives in the ROD, the court noted that as to construction of the
Range, the Navy had issued the ROD before entering into a contract for
construction, and thus did not violate the regulation.23  Further, the
court noted that nothing in the record suggested that the Navy did not
plan to consider alternatives for operations in the Range in order to
minimize impacts on the whale or other listed species.'
Next, the court held that the NMFS's biological opinion did address in
detail the potential impact on listed species of the operation of the
Range, and the court noted that the opinion concluded that while
construction would not affect listed species, operation of the Range would
likely adversely affect the North Atlantic Right Whale, although it would
not jeopardize its existence.' The court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the NMFS's analysis of the Range's operation was not unique
to the Range and therefore not "meaningful" because it relied on the
results of NMFS's prior analyses of the impact on listed species of the
Navy's anti-submarine training activities in a larger area off Jackson-
ville that would include the Range.2 6 The court concluded that the
agency's reliance on its past opinions did not undermine its opinion
regarding the impact of the Range on the whale and other listed species
because the previous analyses "also clearly considered the specific types
of training proposed for the [Range]." The court also pointed out that
any potential impacts of the operation of the Range that the NMFS could
not take into account due to lack of information at the time of its
opinion, would be analyzed again when the Navy and the agency
conferred for the subsequent biological opinion just prior to commence-
ment of operations.' The court declined to adopt the position of courts
in the Ninth Circuit that a biological opinion must be "coextensive in
scope" with the entire project to satisfy the ESA.2" The court noted
that nothing in the ESA required such a rule.o The court also
concluded that even if it were to adopt such a rule, the NMFS's
biological opinion in this case did consider both construction and
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1122-23.
26. Id. at 1119.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1120-21.
29. Id. at 1121.
30. Id.
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operation of the Range based on all information available to it at the
time of the opinion."
Finally, the court held that the NMFS's issuance of the biological
opinion concluding that operation of the Range would likely adversely
impact the whale, without also issuing an incidental take statement that
would authorize incidental harm but also presumably require mitigation,
was not arbitrary and capricious.' As to the whale, an incidental take
statement would be authorized under the MMPA and would last only
five years, and thus expire well before operation of the Range could
begin." Therefore, the court concluded that it was reasonable for the
Navy and NMFS to agree to defer the incidental take statement until
they entered consultation for a biological opinion prior to commencing
operation." In part, the plaintiffs argued that because of the lack of
an incidental take statement in the 2009 biological opinion, the Navy
was not obligated to reinitiate consultation at all, because an incidental
take statement must include a "trigger" requiring further consultation
if the acting agency's actions result in a take greater than that
authorized by the statement.35 The court noted, however, that the 2009
biological opinion addressed this problem by requiring the Navy to
reinitiate consultation if even a single take occurred." "Thus the
current lack of an incidental take statement means that the trigger for
reinitiating consultation is set to its strictest setting, not that there is
no trigger."' 7
The court also addressed the plaintiffs' argument that, as to sea
turtles, which are not mammals and thus do not fall within the
provisions of the MMPA, there was no five-year limit on an incidental
take authorization and thus no rationale for allowing the NMFS not to
include an incidental take statement in the 2009 opinion." The court
concluded that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the agency to
leave out the statement, given that the Navy had already committed to
reinitiating consultation prior to the operation phase of the Range that
would result in a new biological opinion that would cover the sea
turtle.' Because the NMFS concluded that no take was likely during
the construction phase and that operation of the Range would not
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1123.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1124.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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proceed without a new biological opinion, no adverse effect on the turtle
would occur before the agency issued another biological opinion, which
could include an incidental take statement.40
II. CLEAN Am ACT
In Alabama Environmental Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency, the Eleventh Circuit held that the EPA's disapproval in 2011
of Alabama's revisions to its Clean Air Act State Implementation Plan
(SIP), which the EPA had previously approved in 2008, was unautho-
rized, because the EPA failed to identify any error it made in connection
with the 2008 approval, which was a required determination under
§ 110(kX6) of the CAA42 allowing for such a disapproval." The court
also held that the EPA did not have inherent authority to reconsider the
2008 approval because such authority only exists in the absence of
specific statutory procedures for such reconsideration, which existed
under the CAA in this case." Finally, the court held that the EPA's
initial 2008 approval of the SIP revisions was valid, because the EPA
concluded in 2008 that the revisions would not interfere with other
requirements under the CAA."
The CAA establishes a two-part scheme for controlling air pollution:
first, the EPA identifies air pollutants and formulates standards
applicable to each (the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, or
NAAQS), and second, each state develops a SIP to ensure that the
standards are met within the state.46 Under this system, "so long as,
the ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations is compli-
ance with the [NAAQS], the State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of
emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation."
The EPA must approve a state's initial SIP, but once approved, it cannot
be unilaterally modified by either the state or the EPA." Once
approved, a SIP can be modified in a cooperative process between the
state and the EPA that can be initiated in three ways: first, the state
may voluntarily initiate the revision process under CAA § 110(aX1);"
40. Id. at 1124-25.
41. 711 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2013).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(kX6) (2012).
43. Ala. Envil. Council, 711 F.3d at 1290.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1293.
46. Id. at 1280; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-10.
47. Ala. Envtl. Council, 711 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975)).
48. Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(aX1).
2014] 935
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second, the EPA can require a state to revise a SIP that the EPA
determines to be "substantially inadequate" to attain or maintain the
NAAQS and submit the revisions for EPA approval under CAA
§ 110(k)(5);so and third, if the EPA determines that it took some action
in connection with a SIP in error, it may revise the action pursuant to
CAA § 110(k)(6)." Under CAA § 110(1), the EPA "shall not approve a
[SIP revision] if the revision would interfere with any applicable
requirement" of the CAA.52
The issue in this case involved Alabama's SIP limitations on opacity,
that is, the measure of light blocked by an air emission. Opacity in turn
is a measure of particulate emissions, a pollutant under the CAA.
Alabama's SIP restricts opacity in emissions to 20%, with exceptions.
Under one relevant exception, a source's emissions may block up to 40%
of light during one six-minute period every hour."
In 2003, Alabama proposed to revise its SIP to broaden this exception
to allow sources with continuous opacity monitoring to produce emissions
with up to 100% opacity up to 2% of the time during any quarter that
they are otherwise subject to the 20% limit. Alabama submitted this
proposed revision to the EPA for approval. The EPA subsequently
required Alabama to make certain changes to the revision to ensure that
emissions allowed under the exception would not exceed the overall
emissions during the relevant time period that were allowed by existing
law. Alabama made the changes sought by the EPA, and the EPA
approved the SIP revisions in 2008.14 The EPA found that the pro-
posed revisions "would not increase the allowable average opacity
levels."5 Thus, the requirement of CAA § 110(1) that the revisions not
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(kX5).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(kX6). Section 110(kX6) states:
Whenever the Administrator determines that the Administrator's action
approving, disapproving, or promulgating any plan or plan revision (or part
thereof), area designation, redesignation, classification, or reclassification was in
error, the Administrator may in the same manner as the approval, disapproval,
or promulgation revise such action as appropriate without requiring any further
submission from the State. Such determination and the basis thereof shall be
provided to the State and public.
Id.
52. CAA § 110(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l); Ala. Envtl. Council, 711 F.3d at 1281.
53. Ala. Envtl. Council, 711 F.3d at 1282.
54. Id. at 1282-83.
55. Id. at 1295 (Molloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Approval
and Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Alabama: Proposed Approval of Revisions to
the Visible Emissions Rule and Alternative Proposed Disapproval of Revisions to the
Visible Emissions Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 50930 (Oct. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Alabama: Proposed
Approval] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52)).
936 IVol. 65
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interfere with applicable requirements under the CAA was satisfied, and
the EPA found that it lacked the data necessary to determine what
impact, if any, the revisions might have on particulate emissions. The
plaintiffs' group requested that the EPA reconsider its decision, which
was denied.s"
In December 2008, the plaintiffs' group filed a petition in the Eleventh
Circuit challenging the 2008 approval and subsequently filed its second
request for reconsideration with the EPA. The EPA's new regional
administrator granted the request and in the court case sought a
voluntary remand to the agency for reconsideration of its 2008 approval,
which the court granted."
In April 2011, the EPA published a final rule disapproving Alabama's
SIP revisions, stating there was "a sufficient likelihood that [revisions]
could allow increased mass emissions over what would have been
allowed under the previously approved SIP rule."' The EPA also
stated that it "no longer accepted 'that the average daily opacity limit is
an appropriate or effective tool for evaluating the impact' of the revision
on particulate matter emissions."59 In particular, the 2011 disapproval
notice set out four reasons why opacity did not necessarily correlate to
particulate emissions, including that "one may act independently of the
other.'o
Alabama Power Company then challenged the 2011 disapproval in an
Eleventh Circuit petition, which was consolidated with the plaintiffs'
pending challenge to the 2008 approval, in which Alabama Power and
others had also intervened in support of the 2008 approval. Thus, before
the court were both the EPA's approval of Alabama's SIP revisions in
2008 and the EPA's subsequent disapproval of those revisions in
2011.61 The EPA asserted that it had authority subsequently to
disapprove the SIP revisions on three grounds: (1) CAA § 110(k)(6),
allowing the agency to reverse its previous action if it found the previous
action was "in error;"62 (2) its inherent authority to reconsider its
56. Id. at 1283-84 (majority opinion).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1285 (quoting Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Alabama:
Final Disapproval of Revisions to the Visible Emissions Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 18870, 18876
(Apr. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Alabama: Final Disapproval] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
52)).
59. Id. (quoting Alabama: Final Disapproval, 76 Fed. Reg. 18884).
60. Id. at 1296 (Molloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Alabama:
Proposed Approval).
61. Id.
62. Id. The EPA did not invoke CAA § 110(k)(5) as a basis for its 2011 disapproval; the
court noted that it could not do so because it had never found that the SIP, including the
2014] 937
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decisions; and (3) the court's order remanding the 2008 revisions to the
EPA in the plaintiffs' initial challenge to the EPA's 2008 approval of the
revisions.63
The Eleventh Circuit held that the 2011 disapproval of the SIP
revisions was not authorized by law and upheld the 2008 approval."
First, the court held that the EPA's 2011 disapproval was not authorized
by CAA § 110(k)(6) because the EPA did not make a determination that
the action it was disapproving-that is, its 2008 approval of the
revisions-was done in error.65 The court held that the "plain language
of the statute" requires that the EPA determine that it made an error in
reaching its prior decision in order to invoke its authority under the
statute to revise the prior decision, and went on to conclude that the
EPA "has been unable to point to a determination of the error committed
in the 2008 approval." The court noted that the agency needs to
make an "explicit," "clearly articulated," and "affirmative" error
determination in its notice of intent to revise an earlier decision in order
to invoke its authority under CAA § 110(k)(6), stating that the court
would not "speculate" on or "be compelled to guess at" the precise error
the agency relied on.
Second, the court rejected the EPA's argument that it had inherent
authority to revise an earlier decision, holding that such authority does
not exist where Congress has provided a specific mechanism to make
such a determination, as it had in CAA § 110(kX6). 68 The court noted
2008 revisions, was "substantially inadequate" to maintain NAAQS. 711 F.3d at 1290
(majority opinion).
63. 711 F.3d at 1286-87.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1287.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1287-88, 1290. The dissenting judge, comparing language in the 2008
approval with that in the 2011 disapproval, noted that in 2008 the EPA determined that
the revisions would not affect any applicable attainment requirement under the CAA, a
finding it was required to make under CAA § 110(l), while in its 2011 disapproval the EPA
noted that because of information showing the possible lack of correlation between opacity
and particulate matter, it was no longer certain whether this was the case. Ala. Envil.
Council, 711 F.3d at 1296 (Molloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
dissent argued that because the CAA required the EPA "to ensure that the proposed
revision will not interfere" with applicable attainment requirements, the EPA's expressed
uncertainty in the 2011 disapproval was tantamount to a determination that its 2008
decision was made in error. Id. The dissent acknowledged that the EPA's 2011 notice of
disapproval "does not use the specific words 'error' or 'correction.'" Id. "And it does not
provide an easy descriptor of the error or expressly invoke [CAA] § 110(k)(6). But, just as
the majority does not require the EPA to intone 'magic words,' [see Ala. Enutl. Council, 711
F.3d at 1290] there is no reason why such omissions should doom the agency's action." Id.
68. Ala. Enytl. Council, 711 F.3d at 1290 (majority opinion).
938 [Vol. 65
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that it had previously held that an agency did have such inherent
authority to revise its decisions but only in the circumstance where
Congress has not provided for such a procedure.69
Third, the court held that its order remanding the EPA's 2008
approval of the SIP revisions to the agency for further consideration did
not provide independent authorization for the EPA to disapprove its
2008 approval.o
Next, the court turned to the plaintiffs' challenge to the 2008 approval
of Alabama's SIP revisions." The EPA did not defend the 2008
approval in the present lawsuit, but Alabama Power, as intervenor,
did.72  The court upheld the 2008 approval of the revisions. The
court noted that under the standard of review applicable to an agency's
interpretation of a statute dictated by Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.," where the statue is ambiguous, the
court is required to defer to the agency's decision if it is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." The court concluded first that
the CAA "does not directly speak to how a determination of interference
is to be made," and second, given that conclusion, the court concluded
that the EPA's finding in 2008 that the SIP revisions would not interfere
with attainment requirements under the CAA was a "permissible"
interpretation of "interference" under CAA § 110(1).76 The court noted
that the EPA had concluded in the 2008 approval that approval of
revisions was permitted under CAA § 110(l) "unless the agency finds it
will make air quality worse"77 and that the revisions "would not
interfere with either annual or 24-hour particulate matter NAAQS,"78
even though it had also concluded that it could not determine what
impact, if any, the revisions would have on particulate matter emis-
sions." The court held that the EPA's interpretation of CAA § 110(l)
was permissible.80 Ironically, the court stated that the EPA's 2011
interpretation of the statute, in concluding that it could no longer say
69. Id. (citing Gun S., Inc. v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858 (11th Cir. 1989)).
70. Id. at 1291-92.
71. Id. at 1292.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1293.
74. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
75. Ala. Envtl. Council, 711 F.3d at 1292.
76. Id. at 1292-93 (quoting Ky. Res. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 467 F.3d 986, 995 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
77. Id. at 1293 (quoting Ky. Res. Council, Inc., 467 F.3d at 995).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1284, 1293.
80. Id. at 1293.
2014]1 939
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with certainty that the revisions would not interfere with maintaining
NAAQS, was also a permissible interpretation and that the court would
"pass no judgment" on it."' The court noted that there can be more
than one permissible interpretation, and that it would defer to an
agency's interpretation even if the favored interpretation represented "a
dramatic shift in EPA policy.""
The court's choice of the EPA's 2008 approval over the 2011 disapprov-
al based on Chevron deference is interesting because in most circum-
stances the agency's interpretation at issue represents the agency's then-
current position. For example, in Friends of the Everglades v. South
Florida Water Management District," cited by the Eleventh Circuit in
support of its decision favoring the 2008 approval, the South Florida
Water Management District was sued over its failure to obtain a permit
under the Clean Water Act (CWA)" for moving water containing
pollutants from canals it managed into Lake Okeechobee, an activity
that, at least arguably, required a permit under the CWA." Between
the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida requiring the agency to obtain a permit and the Eleventh
Circuit's review of that decision on appeal, the EPA promulgated a new
regulation specifically excepting such activity from the permit require-
ment." The Eleventh Circuit deferred to the new rule, despite much
persuasive authority against it, as a permissible interpretation of an
ambiguous provision of the CWA." Although the EPA's regulation at
issue in Friends of the Everglades seems to defy common sense, the
court's decision can at least be understood as deference to the agency's
current position on the issue. In Alabama Environmental Council, in
contrast, the court prefers the agency's older interpretation (which
perhaps not coincidently dates from the same political era as the agency
interpretation it favored in Friends of the Everglades) over the agency's
most recent interpretation despite indicating that both interpretations
are, or at least could be, permissible." Of course, the easy answer here
is that once the court had held that the EPA's 2011 disapproval was
unauthorized, it technically was not before the court as an alternative
permissible interpretation of CAA § 110(l), and thus the court took pains
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210,
1219 (11th Cir. 2009)).
83. 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
84. 33 U.S.C. H§ 1251-1387 (2012).
85. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1210.
86. Id. at 1213, 1218.
87. Id. at 1228.
88. 711 F.3d at 1294.
940 [Vol. 65
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to "pass no judgment" on it from that standpoint. 9 Still, the 2011
disapproval provides a fairly clear indication that the EPA no longer
believes it made the correct decision in approving Alabama's SIP
revisions in 2008, and an argument could be made that that interpreta-
tion, even if not in a form the court considers acceptable, is entitled to
deference.
In United States v. Alabama Power Co.,o a long-running dispute
between Alabama Power and the EPA (referred to in the case as the
"government") over modifications Alabama Power made to three of its
coal-fired power plants between 1985 and 1997, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the government's expert testimony as to the effect of the
modifications on emissions from the plants was admissible as part of the
government's case to show that the modifications were "major modifica-
tions" under the CAA." The.court reversed the decision of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which had
excluded the testimony as the result of a challenge under Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc."
The case concerned three units in Alabama Power's system and
whether the modifications that Alabama Power made to the plants
constituted "major modification[s]" under the CAA;93 if so, Alabama
Power would have been required to obtain performance review and
permits before making the modifications, which it did not do.' At one
of its units, Alabama Power changed the method of air flow within the
plant. At the two other units, Alabama Power replaced boiler compo-
nents. The purpose of each of these modifications was to reduce the
amount of time that the units were inoperative due to equipment
breakdowns. As the court noted, the less time a unit is inoperable, the
more time it is available to operate, and thus the more emissions it can
produce."
89. See id. at 1293.
90. 730 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013).
91. Id. at 1285.
92. Id. at 1282; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
93. Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d at 1281. Operators of new major sources of air pollution
constructed after 1977, and any existing major source undergoing a "major modification,"
must obtain pre-construction permits under the CAA that place limits on pollutants they
emit. Id. A "major modification" to a source comprises physical or operational changes to
the source that result in a "significant net emissions increase" from the source. Id.
(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(bX2)(i) (2014)). "Routine maintenance, repair and replacement"
activities are not modifications. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(a) (2014).
94. Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d at 1281.
95. Id. at 1281-82.
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The type of units involved in the case are known as cycling
units--that is, their function within the power generation system is to
come online and generate power during regular periods of higher power
usage in the system.96 Cycling units are "operated on a regular or
fairly regular basis, but not continuously," unlike so-called baseload
units, which operate continuously at full capacity."
In its case before the district court, the government proposed to
introduce the testimony of its experts, a power plant reliability engineer,
Robert Koppe, and an environmental permitting engineer, Dr. Ranajit
Sahu, to show that at the time it undertook the respective work on each
of its plants, Alabama Power reasonably should have expected that the
modifications would result in significant net increases of regulated
emissions at the plants and thus should have applied for permits prior
to making the modifications. The experts' studies (hereinafter the
Koppe-Sahu model), which were based in part on studies conducted by
Alabama Power itself of the expected effect on availability and power
generation of the modifications, purported to show that at the time
Alabama Power undertook the modifications at each of the plants in
question, Alabama Power knew or expected that as a result of the
modifications the plants would be available to operate for a greater
period than prior to the modifications, and, crucially, that Alabama
Power would actually operate the plants during the newly available
time." As a result of the increased operation, the plants' increased
emissions would include a "significant net increase" of sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxide, regulated pollutants under the CAA."
In the Daubert challenge, the district court concluded that the Koppe-
Sahu model was unreliable when applied to cycling plants, such as the
ones at issue in the case, and excluded the testimony, because the
experts' "presumption that an increase in a facility's annual capacity will
result in a proportionately equal increase in its output is only valid if
the facility is operated virtually continuously at the highest level of
output possible"-in other words, as in a baseload plant."o The
district court relied on and applied the reasoning from United States v.
Cinergy Corp.,"o where the Seventh Circuit reached the same conclu-
96. United States v. Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253-54 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
97. Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d at 1285 (quoting United States v. Cinergy Corp., 623 F.3d
455, 459 (7th Cir. 2010)).
98. Id. at 1280-83.
99. Id. at 1284.
100. Id. (quoting Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1258).
101. 623 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 2010).
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sion about similar expert testimony applied to cycling units.102 The
gist of the court's reasoning was that with a cycling plant (that is, one
whose output is increased and decreased according to fluctuating
demand on the power grid but does not run continuously at full capacity)
there can be no presumption that an increase in the time a plant is
available to be operated would necessarily result in an increase in the
time the plant is actually operated.'0o
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, concluding that the Koppe-Sahu
model could be used to estimate emissions from cycling units.o'0 The
court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the
experts' testimony.'s The court noted that in Cinergy Corp., the
Seventh Circuit held that testimony similar to the Koppe-Sahu model
was unreliable for a cycling plant "[wlithout expert testimony to support
an estimate of actual emissions caused by the modifications."0 The
court then noted that in Cinergy Corp., the government's expert
testimony was insufficient to show increased actual emissions from the
plants at issue; in contrast, in the present case, the court concluded that
Koppe and Sahu "submitted ample evidence" to support a conclusion
about actual emissions from the plants following the modifications.0 7
In particular, the court noted, Koppe had testified at the Daubert
hearing that in his opinion, the Koppe-Sahu model could be applied to
a cycling unit if three conditons were met:
(1) that the unit, assuming the modification provides additional hours
of unit availability, will actually use the additional available hours; (2)
that the unit will not spend more time in reserve shutdown in the
future [than] it did in the past; and (3) that the output factor for the
unit will not decrease.'
The district court had not rejected the applicability of these factors per
se, but instead concluded that there was no evidence that these were
met because the government had only demonstrated that the factors
were met at the plants at issue "by the ipse dixit of the expert[s]."'o
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's conclusion as to
the lack of supporting evidence was clearly erroneous."o In its
102. Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d at 1284.
103. Id. at 1285.
104. Id. at 1288.
105. Id. at 1284.
106. Id. at 1285 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cinergy Corp., 623 F.3d at 460).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Ala. Power Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 n.14).
110. Id. at 1285-86.
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opinion, the court included excerpts from Koppe's testimony at the
Daubert hearing that according to the court, demonstrated factual
support for the experts' conclusion that each of the factors were met at
each plant.'
111. Id. at 1286-88.
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